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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Since 2008, significant progress has been made towards achieving the goal of Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process, which was to secure sustainable 
peace, stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. Under the KNDR agreements, the main parties to the 2007 elections dispute 
committed to immediately stop violence, expeditiously facilitate durable solutions to 
victims of that violence, end the political crisis through power-sharing and find lasting 
solutions to underlying causes that had sparked the crisis. The promulgation of the new 
constitution in August 2010 was one of the most important outcomes of the KNDR 
process and the hallmark of Kenya’s reform journey since independence.  
2. South Consulting has been monitoring the implementation of agreed reforms 
since2008. This is the fourth review report for the year 2011. It is also the fourth review 
report since the new constitution came into force. Previous reports covering the period 
between December 2008 and October 2011 can be found at www.dialoguekenya.org 
3. This report covers the September to December 2011 period. Like the previous report, it 
focuses on what has been achieved thus far and the country’s preparedness for the next 
General Election in 2012. It discusses what needs to be done to consolidate reforms 
under the new constitution, prepare for a change through a national General Election 
and to manage a peaceful transition from the current centralised system of governance 
to a devolved structure. It also discusses the unfinished business from the previous 
General Election, particularly the problem of impunity, Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and lack of reconciliation, and how this ‘baggage’ might impact the dual 
transition.    
4. The report has utilised both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data derives 
from a national survey conducted in December 2011. Qualitative data is drawn from 
interviews with key informants from government ministries, humanitarian and civil 
society organisations, the media and members of the public.  Secondary sources have 
also been reviewed for additional information.  
FINDINGS  
5. The end of 2011 shifts attention away from fundamental reforms to the next General 
Election.The socio-economic context for the General Election is also a cause for 
anxiety. Inflation has been on the rise and there are signs of an economic slowdown 
reminiscent of experiences around election time in the past. Nonetheless, the 
campaigns have begun in earnest and popular demand for reforms appears to be 
waning.  
6. On the whole, global economic conditions indicate that the Kenyan economy is likely to 
remain in a state of flux, a likelihood exacerbated by the military incursion into 
Somalia and measures to address domestic security implications. This 
notwithstanding, Kenyans are very supportive of the government’s fight against the Al 
Shabaab group in Somalia. 
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Implementation of the New Constitution 
7. The promulgation of the constitution in 2010 anchored institutional reforms and filled 
legal lacunae that had long prevented change. As reported in the previous review 
report, the constitutional implementation process remains on track: the necessary legal 
and institutional framework for implementation is in place.  
8. By the end of August 2011, Parliament had passed all Bills listed in the constitution as 
requiring enactment within a year of its promulgation. Once the deadline was met, the 
pace of passing Bills slowed down. In this reporting period, nearly all of eight Bills due 
on 26 February have been taken to the Constitution Implementation Commission for 
review. Lethargy in producing Bills might replicate the last-minute rush witnessed in 
August 2011, and sabotage public scrutiny of these proposed laws. This calls for greater 
civil society oversight and advocacy for expedient legislative process. 
9. Lack of consensus and open disagreement between key agencies such as the CIC and 
the Office of the Attorney General run the risk of undermining public support for the 
implementation process. Allegations of lack of political will, reinforced by attempts to 
introduce multiple amendments to the constitution and delays in completing 
preparations for the devolution legislative framework are likely to give the impression 
that it is business as usual.  
10. As the next General Election approaches, there is mounting public concern that critical 
Bills for the transition to the devolved system of government have not been passed. 
Some have not even been drafted, let alone presented for debate. At the same time, 
tension between ministries over the nature of devolution and financial management 
continue to delay enactment of requisite laws. Given the complexity of the devolved 
structure, further delays are likely to cause panic or occasion a constitutional crisis. 
Many people, up to 47 per cent of survey respondents, see divisions among politicians 
such as these, as the main hindrance to the implementation process. Public vigilance is 
required to fight off the vested interests that could undermine the spirit and letter of 
the constitution. 
Electoral Reforms and Preparedness for Elections 
11. Some electoral reforms have been made in readiness for the General Election in 2012. 
Requisite laws have been passed as required by the new constitution. An independent 
electoral body has been set up and staffed through a competitive recruitment process. 
Public confidence in the IEBC is on the rise. The new independent electoral body has 
developed a work-plan the next General Election.  
 
12. However, there is uncertainty about constitutional provisions on gender balance in 
elective offices, the election date and delimitation of constituency boundaries. There 
have been proposals to amend the constitution to address some of these concerns. But 
the public is not generally supportive of all the proposals. While many support the 
amendment to address the gender equity gaps, survey respondents were not amenable 
to all proposals on the election date. 
 
13. The absence of a comprehensive civic and voter education is a cause for concern. Plans 
have already been finalised to roll out activities in this regard. But given that the 
country is approaching the election date, it would be important to identify priority 
areas in this respect. Given that 93 per cent of the respondents know only a little or 
8  
  
 
nothing about the constitution, civil society organisations need to begin voter and civic 
education early to avoid having some clauses interpreted politically, as happened 
during the 201o referendum.  
 
14. Equally important in regard to preparations for elections is the observation that 
political parties are yet to institutionalise. They appear to be unprepared for the 
election and therefore one may argue that their parties may prefer a date that is 
convenient to them. Although they are required to comply with the political parties law, 
many are yet to commit to it and change their culture. Their weakness as institutions 
could have spill over effects into the Coalition government. This raises an important 
concern over whether the Coalition is also cohesive enough to oversee the transition 
and the conduct of the elections. If divisions in the Coalition intensify, there is no 
institutional mechanism to resolve disputes and ensure that the divisions between the 
two parties do not immobilise the government. There is nothing to ensure that this 
form of institutional immobilism will not affect how elections are conducted. 
The Legacy of Post-Election Violence 
15. Even as the country prepares for the next General Election, the legacy of 2007 
continues to hang over Kenya; the International Criminal Court (ICC) is set to rule on 
confirmation of charges in January 2012. Lack of consensus in government about how 
to respond to the independent investigation by the ICC, and whether to punish or grant 
amnesty to middle and lower-level perpetrators of the post-election violence has sent 
mixed signals about dealing with impunity as the country approaches another national 
election. The pursuit of accountability is even less likely to draw political attention or 
support as the elections approach.  
16. Public support for the ICC remains high. A majority of the respondents – 64 per cent – 
are happy that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects. Despite continued high support for 
the ICC, public confidence in a local process remains relatively low in spite of the 
current judicial reforms. In particular, the perception that the government is unlikely 
to conduct genuine investigations, or prosecute powerful individuals, has sustained 
high support for the ICC as the justice mechanism of last resort. 
17. The government has continued to support IDPs to find durable solutions by giving 
them money, farm inputs, land and houses. The Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Resettlement of IDPs finalised a draft Bill on the Protection and Assistance of IDPs. In 
December, the government appointed an inter-ministerial task force to expedite the 
resettlement of IDPs before the next General Election. However, as reported in the 
previous quarter, allocation of land to IDPs rather than all landless people has 
generated new narratives of favouritism of members of one community, and 
undermined peace and reconciliation in some return areas.  
18. Reconciliation and social harmony in areas most affected by the post-election violence 
remains fragile. People remember what happened in 2007. Lack of political support for 
peace and reconciliation efforts by government and non-governmental organisations 
has created a climate of silence and suspicion. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) 
have continued their efforts to inquire into human rights violations and prevent future 
violence, respectively. However, without political support for the work of these 
commissions, their impact on ethnic relations and deterrence capacity for future 
9  
  
 
dissonance remains uncertain.  
Conclusions 
19. Public anxiety over the socio-economic and political challenges facing the country 
could increase as the next national General Election approaches. The high cost of living 
is affecting everyone and occasioning industrial action by groups hitherto silent on the 
issue of better wages and services. These are new pressures on the economy, whose 
growth tends to slow every election year. Increased public disillusionment is showing 
in the perception of the government’s ability to manage economic wellbeing. Up to 80 
per cent of those interviewed said they were dissatisfied with the government’s 
performance in managing the economy, and an equal percentage deplored its 
responsiveness to unemployment. Managing these dynamics is critical this time round 
to prevent them from conflating with Kenya’s major political fault lines. 
 
20. Implementation of the constitution is on track but there are fears that vested interests 
are again gaining an upper hand to prevent the finalization and passage of critical laws. 
Furthermore, the window for undertaking brave measures has closed. The campaigns 
for the next General Election have gained momentum and will soon constrain the 
undertaking of important reforms. And if leaders begin to politicize some of the 
implementation processes and demand amendments that would remove important 
planks from the constitution, then the implementation will be in disarray. These efforts 
could reduce the momentum for constitution implementation.   
 
21. Preparations to usher in the devolved system of government are experiencing 
difficulties owing to lack of consensus among some of the key players, particularly the 
ministries of Finance and Local Government. Delays in finalizing critical Bills could 
affect the process of laying a solid foundation for the county government. These delays 
could slow the pace at which relevant measures for setting up county governments are 
undertaken. The county governments will be introduced at once and therefore all 
preparations should be completed and anchored on a solid legal and policy framework. 
22. The next General Election marks a major turning point in Kenya because it will lead to 
immediate operationalisation of the central and county governments. For this reason, 
it is important that adequate preparations be made to transit the country to the two 
government systems. Indeed, many people have their eyes on the county as a solution 
to local development problems – including imbalances in regional development. It is 
important, therefore, to do things right and in a manner that responds to this 
aspiration. 
23. Finally, it is important to underline that the Coalition government has not been very 
cohesive during much of its time. Although it has matured over time, it is important to 
establish a solid framework to resolve any disputes that may arise now and the time of 
conducting the next general election. Their divisions especially over power sharing 
could have negative consequences on the electoral process. Furthermore, if divisions 
deepen before the general election, ensuing institutional immobility will make it 
difficult for the government to operate as one. A framework to ensure coherence must 
be put in place – reactivating the Committee for the Management of Coalition Affairs is 
critical at this stage. 
 
10  
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
24. This quarterly review report covers the period between September and December 2011. 
The review focuses on implementation of the constitution and other reforms agreed 
upon under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) mediation 
process in 2008 under the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
led by Mr Kofi Annan. Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org.  
 
25. The report is based on both primary and secondary sources of data. Quantitative data 
was collected through a national survey comprising 2,500 respondents using multi-
stage cluster sampling proportionate to population size, with the 2010 National Census 
data as the sampling frame. Qualitative data was obtained through interviews with key 
informants drawn from government ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil 
society organisations, the media and members of the public.  Secondary information 
was obtained by reviewing reports and documents by the government, development 
agencies, the media and non-governmental organisations. 
 
26. The report is arranged in five main parts which discuss the main political 
developments in Kenya in the reporting period. The emphasis in all the parts is the 
implementation of the new constitution and other reforms outlined in Agenda 4, as 
well as preparedness for the 2012 General Election. Thus, the report is organised as 
follows: 
a. Part I: Introduction and Socio-economic Context 
b. Part II: Progress Toward Implementing the New Constitution and Agenda 4 
Reforms 
c. Part III: Electoral Reforms and Preparedness for Elections in 2012 
d. Part IV: The Legacy of Post-Election Violence: The ICC and IDPs 
e. Part V: Conclusion 
The Socio-economic Context 
 
27. The second half of 2011 saw a steep rise in inflation and depreciation of the Kenya 
shilling. Measures by the government stabilised the shilling but inflation remained 
high towards the end of the year. The high cost of living increased the vulnerability of 
the poor across the country. The 2011 Horn of Africa drought crisis added to these 
challenges, especially among the poor in northern Kenya.  
 
28. The high cost of living remained the main challenge facing Kenya throughout 2011. 
When asked, ‘In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today?’, 
71 per cent cited the high cost of living.  9 per cent mentioned unemployment while 7 
per cent and 6 per cent mentioned corruption and poor leadership, respectively.  
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Figure 1: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today? 
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29. Other issues mentioned include unemployment, poor infrastructure, food shortages 
due to rain failure/drought, diseases and lack of social amenities, high death rate and 
population increase. As mentioned in previous reports, the high cost of living is slowly 
becoming an important fissure for an election contest. In this regard, it is notable that 
protests by some labour unions and workers’ strikes demanding higher remuneration 
and better terms of service featured prominently in the last quarter of 2011.  
30. These development slowed growth in some sectors. It is, therefore, possible that the 
overall growth would be lower than expected.2 The country, therefore, moves into the 
election year on the verge of an economic slowdown. Failure to manage the risks 
associated with a weak shilling could reduce this growth further.3  
31. The year 2011 has seen a steady rise in inflation, peaking in November at 19.75 per 
cent. In December, it dropped to 18.6 per cent.  
                                                
2There is some optimism, however, in that growth had not slumped. See World Bank, Kenya’s Economic 
Update, No. 5, Dec 2011, p. ii  
3The weak shilling was attributed to high international food and fuel process, drought crisis which affected a 
large part of northern and north-eastern regions, conflict in the Horn of Africa region, the Euro crisis and 
widening fiscal and current accounts deficits, ibid  
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Figure 2: Inflation in Kenya (2010 to 2011) 
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32. The high cost of living is pushing more people into poverty. More and more people are 
unable to meet their basic needs, a trend exacerbated by high levels of unemployment 
particularly among the youth. The Youth Scenarios report released by the Institute for 
Economic Affairs in November 2011 observed that countries with a high youth 
population have registered a 3.6 per cent economic growth. The report noted that over 
the next 15 years, a big youth population is inescapably going to lead to higher 
unemployment (double the national average), exacerbating rural-urban migration and 
competition for resources, with increased crime and insecurity.4 
 
33. Although these are future projections, they are relevant for the present time. This is 
reflected in how people feel about safety:  52 per cent feel safer than they did after the 
post-election violence while 34 per cent are feeling less safe and 14 per cent feel about 
the same. Whereas more Kenyans should be feeling safer, it is possible to attribute the 
low numbers to a number of factors. First, the high cost of living has increased petty 
crime and domestic violence.5 There are also different forms of inter-communal 
resource-based conflicts in several parts of the country.6 In some areas, people are also 
concerned about the outcome of confirmation of charges hearings by the International 
Criminal Court, which is expected to rule in January 2012. Finally, the sense of safety 
has further been impacted by Kenya’s fight against the Al Shabaab militia in Somalia 
from October 2011. Since the launch of the military operation, retaliatory attacks and 
heightened insecurity in northern Kenya as well as security alerts in other parts of the 
                                                
4 Institute for Economic Affairs, Kenya Youth Scenarios (Nairobi: IEA, 2011), p. 
5 Reported cases of mugging, pick-pocketing and domestic violence have increased dramatically. Interview with 
senior government official in the Ministry of Internal Security, October 2011 
6 OCHA, Kenya Humanitarian Bulletin, 29 Dec 2011 
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country have increased public anxiety about the consequences of the ‘war’, particularly 
due to lack of clarity about when the military operation will end. 
 
34. This notwithstanding, many Kenyans are supportive of the government’s fight against 
Al Shabaab through the Operation Linda Nchi, launched after Somali militants 
associated with the terror group kidnapped international aid workers in Daadab 
refugee camp and tourists in the coastal towns of Mombasa and Lamu. Although there 
have been retaliatory attacks on Kenyan territory, over 70 per cent of survey 
respondents said they are satisfied with the way the government is handling the Al 
Shabaab and terrorism. In fact, these are the only areas where the government has the 
highest approval rating. There is general dissatisfaction with how the government is 
handling the economy (80%), tackling corruption (75%), and creating jobs (80%). 
 
Figure 3: How satisfied or not satisfied are you with the way the government is handling 
the following issues, or haven’t you heard enough to say? 
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35. Uncertainty engendered by the fluid economic and political environment and 
insecurity has resulted in some disillusionment. Asked if, on the whole, things in Kenya 
are generally going in the right direction, or the wrong direction, 69 per cent of 
respondents said things are not going in the right direction: 
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Figure 4: Are things generally going in the right direction or wrong direction (by total) 
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36. People would like the governemnt to prioritise addressing the cost of living. When 
asked what should be the priority of the government in thenext year, 64 per cent of the 
respondents said they wanted the coalition to concentrate on lowering the cost of 
living. Eleven per cent mentioned creation of jobs. This is a persistent response in 
previous surveys. This is indicative that some of the underlying causes of the post-
election violence remain inadequately addressed even as Kenya prepares for another 
General Election: 
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Table 1: Most important priority for the government to address next year (by total) 
Please tell me what you think are the TWO most important priorities for the 
government to address next year, starting with the MOST important?   
(Most important, by total) 
Reduce prices of essential commodities/food 64% 
Create Jobs 11% 
Promote peace and reconciliation/intercommunity harmony 6% 
Fight corruption 5% 
Undertake land reforms 4% 
Fight crime/improve on security 3% 
Improve social amenities 2% 
Other 2% 
Resettle IDPs 1% 
Improve infrastructure 1% 
Conclusion 
37. Socio-economic and political challenges facing the country could increase public 
anxiety as the next General Election approaches. The high cost of living is affecting 
everyone. Demands for better wages and remuneration by professionals that featured 
in the previous quarter followed similar demands by the urban poor in the first half of 
2011. These are new pressures on the economy whose growth tends to slow every 
election year. Increased public disillusionment is showing in the perception of the 
government’s ability to manage their economic wellbeing. Up to 80 per cent of those 
interviewed are dissatisfied with the government’s performance with managing the 
economy and an equal percentage deplores its responsiveness to unemployment. The 
government is quickly losing support as shown by 30 per cent of those interviewed 
saying they like ‘nothing’ about the government.  
38. Failure to address factors that impinge on household food security is likely to project 
the state of the economy as a significant campaign theme in 2012. Income inequalities 
combined with poor means of livelihood and the government’s capacity to deliver could 
add to the Kenya’s fault lines during the elections. As 2012 approaches, undertaking 
measures to cushion the poor and prevent the economy from the usual slump 
associated with electoral cycles in Kenya should be prioritised.  
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2. IMPLEMENTION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND OTHER AGENDA 
4 REFORMS 
 
Introduction 
 
39. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) mediation process 
acknowledged that institutional failure and political divisions emanating from Kenya’s 
2005 referendum on the constitution contributed to the post-2007 election violence. 
Under the mediation’s Agenda Item 4, the agreement underscored the importance of 
undertaking far reaching constitutional and institutional reforms in order to move the 
country forward and prevent future violence. The promulgation of the constitution on 
27 August 2010 was, therefore, not only the main achievement of the KNDR process, 
but also the watershed moment for a new culture in the management of public affairs.  
 
40. Schedule 5 of the Constitution listed up to 49 pieces of legislation needed to bring the 
Constitution into effect in a timely manner. This report examines the progress made 
towards implementation of the constitution. It discusses the Bills that have been 
passed, the work of implementation commissions, institutional reforms, challenges 
encountered, devolution and Agenda 4 issues such as land reform, poverty reduction 
and the fight against corruption.  
The Constitution Implementation Process 
Passing of Bills 
 
41. In addition to the 26 laws passed by the end of the first year, Parliament passed several 
other laws between October and December 2011. The laws passed and those pending 
are shown in the Table 2. 
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Table 2: Passed and Pending Bills 2011 
 Passed Bills 
1. Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act, 2011 
2. Judicial Service Commission Act, 2011 
3. Supreme Court Act, No. 7 of 2011 
4. Independent Offices Appointment Act, 2011 
5. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act, 2011 
6. Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act, 2011 
7. Political Parties Act, 2011 
8. Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, 2011 
9. Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011 
10. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, 2011 
11. National Gender and Equality Commission Act, 2011 
12. Commission on Revenue Allocation Act, 2011 
13. Contingencies Fund and County Emergency Funds Act, 2011 
14. National Government Loans Guarantee Act, 2011  
15. Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 
16. Industrial Court Act, 2011 
17. Power of Mercy Act, 2011 
18. Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act, 2011 
19. Commission on Administrative  Justice Act, 2011 
20. Elections Act, 2011 
21. Public Appointments (Parliamentary Approval) Act, 2011 
22. National Police Service Commission Act, 2011 
23. Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Act, 2011 
24. National Police Service Act, 2011 
25. Price Control (Essential Goods) Act, 2011 
26. Tourism Act, 2011 
27. Veterinary Surgeons and Veterinary Para-Professionals Act, 2011 
28. Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 2011 
29. Industrial Training (Amendment) Act, 2011 
30. Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act, 2011 
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42. The legislative process has slowed down since August 2011. In this review period, only 
two Bills have been enacted --the Public Appointments (Parliamentary Approval) Bill, 
2011 and Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, 2011. Of the eight Bills due by 
26 February 2012, only the Land Bill, 2011 and Land Registration Bill, 2011 are with 
the CIC undergoing review. The Transition to Devolved Government Bill, 
Intergovernmental Relations Bill and County Government Bill, have been submitted to 
the AG for onward transmission to Parliament. 
 
43. Delays in finalizing the pending Bills should be addressed because a pattern of delay 
and rushing at the eleventh hour is likely to undermine public participation and 
oversight in the legislative process and ultimately undermine the constitution itself.7As 
noted in previous reports, there are vested interests contributing to delays in finalising 
some of the Bills. There are also attempts to subvert public participation. The delays 
could again lead to the rushing of the Bills without scrutiny and adequate public 
participation.  
 
44. Attempts to find the cause of delays results in blame games among the various actors 
involved in the preparation of the Bills. For instance, the CIC and the office of the 
Attorney General have engaged in an acrimonious public exchange, with CIC accusing 
the AG of blocking the implementation process and undermining the rule of law, while 
the AG has accused the CIC of overstepping its mandate. Interviews in different parts 
of Kenya show that while the majority of respondents are happy with the 
implementation of the new constitution, they are concerned about failure to enforce 
and adhere to the new law. They are also taking issue with the attempt by politicians 
to amend the constitution. They see this as just another ploy to destroy the 
constitution. They think the constitution is good but the problem is not the 
constitution; it is the political leadership.8 
 
45. These observations point to lack of coordination among various actors, competing 
interests, and the absence of a common vision in terms of what the Bills aim to achieve 
in relation to the spirit of the constitution. They are a pointer to ineffective conflict 
management mechanisms in the implementation process. These competing interests 
and blame games remain the single most important new threats to the Kenya’s new 
dawn.  
 
46. Notwithstanding these challenges, public satisfaction with the implementation process 
remains high, at 59 per cent. This is an improvement from the previous review period, 
when 52 per cent were satisfied.  
 
 
Figure 5: How satisfied or not satisfied are you with the progress of implementation of the 
new constitution? 
                                                
7 Briefing Note, November 2011 
8 Interview with civil society leader and political activist in Mombasa, 7Dec 2011 
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Establishment of New Commissions 
 
47. The government has also established/reconstituted independent institutions and 
commissions. The bodies established in the reporting period include: 
• The Salaries and Remuneration Commission 
• Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
• Gender and Equality Commission 
• The Commission on Administrative Justice 
• The Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission 
 
48. The very public and transparent nature of interviews and recruitment processes for 
Commissioners drew some approval, with23 per cent citing the transparent and public 
vetting of candidates as an important change resulting from the constitution. However, 
there are concerns about the Executive compromising the processes of establishing 
new institutions. Some respondents said they were concerned about horse trading by 
the two parties in the coalition and the two Principals in particular. They were worried 
that this is taking the form of political interference with the process of establishing new 
institutions.  Significant also is that some appointments were not done within the 
stipulated timeframe. This is in addition to the integrity questions, concerns about 
gender and ethnic representation that were raised with composition of some of these 
bodies.   
 
49. These issues do not augur well for nascent institutions. They weaken the foundation on 
which the institutions will stand. The issues generally suggest a need for Kenyans to 
remain vigilant and to make the vetting process more effective.  There is also a need to 
establish a framework to guide public participation in the vetting process as well as a 
framework to put Article 10 and Chapter 6 (Leadership and Integrity) of the 
Constitution into operation. Lack of defined criteria to guide balancing of regional, 
gender and ethnic interests with professional skills will result in all forms of 
interference in the recruitment process. And if the process is not predictable or based 
on transparent recruitment processes, then it will prevent qualified people from 
applying for jobs in these bodies.   
 
50. This trend of ‘going back to the old ways of doing things’ with respect to appointments, 
has resulted in a reduced number of Kenyans who say they have seen changes since the 
promulgation of the new constitution. In a survey done in September 2011, up to 53 per 
cent of Kenyans said they had seen some changes. In December 2011, that number 
reduced to just 44 per cent. 
 
Table 3: Have you observed any change since in the country since the adoption of the new 
constitution? 
Have you observed any change in the country since adoption of the new 
Constitution? 
 Oct 2011 Dec 2011  OCT 2011 DEC 2011 
Yes 53% 44% Don’t know 3% 4% 
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51. The reduced number of respondents who say they have noted changes suggests that the 
high sense of optimism expressed during the promulgation is subsiding. The decline 
may be attributed to people feeling that there is a slide to the old ways, a relapse to 
business as usual, or even feeling that there is lack of political commitment to Chapter 
Six of the Constitution. Public disagreements between implementing agencies and 
numerous attempts to amend the sections of the constitution reinforce the perception 
of lack of political commitment to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Arguably, 
real change is yet to trickle in; it is yet to be felt in people’s everyday lives at the 
community level. 
Transiting to a Devolved System of Government 
 
52. Previous reports did mention that many Kenyans supported the new constitution 
because it provides for a devolved system of government. The October 2010 report, in 
particular, observed that people appreciated that devolved government would be 
responsible for the management of local affairs. They supported devolution because 
they wanted resources to address their local issues. The devolved system of government 
will come into effect immediately after the next General Election. Its implementation 
will not be phased. This means that preparations for a devolved system of government 
must be completed before the next General Election. The delicate transition from the 
current governance system to the devolved structure requires a sturdy legal, 
institutional and financial framework. 
 
53. As already noted, despite the urgent need to be prepared for the transition, requisite 
Bills on devolved government have not been debated; the legal framework is yet to be 
completed. There are matters outstanding in the courts regarding the constitutionality 
of some of the Bills enacted before the August 2011 deadline.9 Adding to this complex 
context is also progress in finalising the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Bill, 2011. 
While the CIC had announced in December 2011 that it was finalising review of the Bill, 
the Ministry of Finance appeared not to be aware of this development10.  
 
54. The proposed National Security Council Bill, 2011, which creates a County Security 
Committee that excludes the governor, has also raised concern. Some argue that this 
not only undermines the independence of the county but could also undermine the 
security situation in the devolved system.11 There are concerns too with respect to the 
role of the Provincial Administration. There is apparent determination to retain the 
Provincial Administration, which will be accountable to the national government. Some 
concerns have been raised about the creation of the positions of county co-ordinators 
and representative of the national government before the law on the legal framework 
on devolution structures is finalised.12 
                                                
9 ‘CIC Moves to Court Over Bills Row’ The Star, 25 August,, 2011  
10 ‘Proposed Law Hands Counties Greater Control of Public Funds’ Sunday Nation, 4 December 2011:  
11 Interview with a civil society official monitoring devolution and implementation of the constitution, 25 
November 2011 
12Media reports: Civil Society Groups Demand Amendment of Security Bills, 20 November 2011 
No 44% 51% No 
response 
0% 1% 
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55. Even more disturbing is the lack of clarity about the nature of the relationship between 
the central government and devolved structures. Some leaders have even proposed to 
abolish the Senate, and effectively remove the bi-cameral provisions of the 
Constitution. This, of course, cannot be done without weakening the foundation of 
devolution.  
 
56. Nonetheless, lack of clarity on relationships between the central and the devolved 
government has continued to animate inter-ministerial debate and contestation on 
devolution. For instance, the ministries of Finance on the one hand and that of Local 
Government and the Task Force on Devolved Government on the other have taken 
different positions on the Public Finance Management Bill. Their opposing positions 
have occasioned a protracted delay in processing the Bill. Mediation efforts by the CIC 
and the Principals have been unsuccessful. Contestation over such a critical Bill risks 
polarising the nation and heightening tensions ahead of the next elections.13 
 
57. Chapter Two of the Constitution provides the guiding principles on how devolved 
governments will deliver services in a democratic Kenya, notably in accordance with 
national values outlined in Article10. Many people are still optimistic about devolution.  
A majority of the respondents said they wanted the devolved government to prioritise 
job creation:  
 
Figure 6: In preparation for the transition to the county governments, what do you want to 
see as the government priorities? 
                                                
13 Interview with a civil society leader, 5 December 2011 
23  
  
 
46%
14%
13%
8%
3%
3%
3%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Job	  creation
Security
Fighting	  human	  rights
Promoting	  healing	  and	  reconciliation
Reforming	  the	  electoral	  system
Respecting	  human	  rights
Institutional	  reforms	  (e.g.	  judicial,	  police)
Economic	  development
Resettling	  IDPs
Equitable	  distribution	  of	  resources
Reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  living
Promoting	  education	  standards
Dont	  know
In	  preparation	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  County	  governments,	  what	  do	  
you	  want	  to	  see	  as	  the	  government	  priorities?	  (total)
 
 
58. But in some counties, devolution appears to lend itself to interpretations that could 
frustrate national unity and the principles of diversity spelt out in the constitution. 
Interviews show that in multi-ethnic counties, devolution is viewed as an opportunity 
to exploit local resources to the exclusion of those who are numerically fewer.14  Some 
leaders in these counties also perceive devolution as an opportunity to restrict 
competition for political power and control of resources within particular spaces.15 In 
some regions, the minority groups have openly been cautioned against aspiring for any 
leadership positions in the counties.16 Others perceive county governments as an 
opportunity to deal with historical injustices, particularly grievances around land 
distribution. Fears and possibilities of marginalisation of perceived foreigners and 
minority groups are real. They could galvanise ethnic polarisation and undermine 
national stability and cohesion in some counties.17 
 
59. In some counties, dominant communities are already demanding control of the public 
service and resources.18 Fears about discrimination, biased use of resources and 
marginalisation are evident among Kenyans as the country prepares for devolution.           
                                                
14 Interview with a community elder and leader in Rift Valley, 16 November 2011  
15 Interviews with political leaders in Rift Valley, November 2011, and Coast, December 2011 
16 Interview with a civil society official in the Rift Valley, 17 November 2011 
17 Interviews with a leader of a civil society organisation in Eldoret, 16 November 2011 
18 Interview with an official of the Provincial Administration, Rift Valley, 15 November 2011 
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Figure 7: What fears do you have, if any, regarding the formation of county government? 
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60. Lack of civic education:  That the implementation process has been going on for over a 
year without civic education raises serious questions about the capacity of Kenyans to 
participate in the process and also transform their way of life in line with the 
requirements of the constitution. The Task Force on Devolved Government was 
mandated to develop a programme on civic education on the devolved government.19 
Although the Task Force had drafted a detailed programme and even proposed a Bill 
on civic education, which was dropped, the civic education programme on counties has 
not kicked off.  
 
61. There are other challenges. Not everyone in the country is supportive of the proposal 
to amend the constitution. While there is wide consensus on the necessity to amend the 
provision on how to achieve gender balance and other provisions that appear 
inconsistent, only about half of the survey respondents support the proposed 
amendment on the election date.  
 
62. Over half of the survey respondents support all the proposed changes. In the December 
2011 survey, over three quarters of respondents were supportive of the amendments to 
                                                
19 Gazette notice number 12876 of October 25, 2011 
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provide for gender equity in elective posts but only half were supportive of other 
proposed amendments.  
 
Table 4: Do you support the proposal to amend the New Constitution with regard to the 
following? 
Do you support the proposal to amend the New Constitution with regard to the 
following? 
 Yes No Don’t 
Know/NR 
Change election date for next year from August to December 2012 55% 41% 4% 
Change the election date from August to December in all future 
elections 
52% 44% 4% 
Amend to ensure women get one third members in Parliament 72% 25% 3% 
Amend to ensure 80 new constituencies vote in the next election 57% 35% 8% 
 
63. Half (50 per cent) of the 54 per cent supporting the change of the election date from 
August to December 2012 argue that holding elections in August could interrupt the 
smooth running of school education programmes, particularly because schools are 
used as polling centers. ‘It means the whole term is disrupted by loud political 
campaigns. If there is a run-off, schools will not open on time in September. If 
elections are not peaceful, schools will be turned into IDP camps. August is not a good 
time; candidates are preparing for final exams and need peace and quiet to 
prepare.’20 
                                                
20 Interview with an elderly man in Kibera, 4 Dec 2011 
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Figure 8: Please explain why you are in support of: Change election date for next year from 
August to December 2012? (total) 
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64. Another 24 per cent think the newly established Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission should be allowed adequate time to prepare for the complex elections in 
2012, including voter registration and civic/voter education. Nine per cent and 7 per 
cent, respectively, think the President and elected MPs should be allowed to finish their 
terms. Of those opposed to a change of the electoral date, 45 per cent believe the 
government should adhere to provisions of the constitution. 
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Figure 9: Please explain why you are NOT in support of: Change election date for next year 
from August to December 2012? (total) 
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65. Up to 12 per cent argue the proposed changes are driven by political interests. Nine per 
cent reinforce this view by recalling that when majority voted YES in the referendum, 
they knew they were endorsing elections in August. Another 23 per cent say elections in 
December interrupt the festive season for families, while 4per cent say it is too early to 
start introducing changes to the new constitution. Some argue that legislators are 
rushing to make amendments without first attempting to implement the sections of 
Constitution in question.21 
 
66. Efforts to introduce changes to the Constitution have undermined the bi-partisan 
consensus that had already begun to form within Parliament. Those who are in favour 
of amendment say minimum changes are imperative in the short term, while those 
opposed argue proposed changes are reminiscent of the fate of the independence 
constitution, which was ‘amended so many times it was unrecognisable and 
ultimately lost its capacity for necessary checks and balances.22 Because of this and as 
noted in the previous reports, once again, about half of the respondents cited political 
divisions as a threat to implementation.  
                                                
21 Remarks by an MP during a public forum, 5 December 2011 
22 Remarks by a politician during the 3rd KNDR Conference, 5 December 2011 
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67. Public participation in the constitution implementation process is still low. Most 
Kenyans say they have not attended meetings where the new laws are being discussed. 
 
Figure 10: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding 
making of new laws under the new constitution? 
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Institutional Reforms 
 
68. The 2007 electoral dispute and the ensuing violence were attributed to institutional 
failure stemming from internal weaknesses or political interference in the operations of 
those institutions.23 The police force, the electoral commission, the judiciary and the 
civil service did not enjoy public confidence. The new constitution contains provisions 
for re-engineering some of these institutions, in addition to creating new ones.  
 
69. Perhaps inspired by the manner in which some of the institutions have recruited their 
senior leadership, many Kenyans (77%) have confidence in the Independent Electoral 
and Boundaries Commission. Another 65 per cent of survey respondents said they have 
confidence in the Judiciary, while a relatively small (40%) number have confidence in 
the police force and political parties (36%). 
                                                
23 Report of the Task Force on Devolution, September 2011 
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Table 5: How much confidence do you have in the following institutions as we go to the 
next General Election? 
Do you support the proposal to amend the New Constitution with 
regard to the following? 
 
 
Confident 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Not at all 
Confident 
DK/NR 
The Electoral & Boundaries 
Commission(IEBC) 
77% 8% 2% 13% 
Judiciary 65% 24% 5% 5% 
Police 40% 36% 22% 2% 
Political Parties 36% 36% 24% 4% 
 
70. As noted in the last quarterly report, judicial reforms remain an important change the 
country has seen since the promulgation of the new constitution. In this reporting 
period, the Chief Justice gave an outline of plans for the next year when he presented 
his report of his first 120 days in office to the public. The Judicial Service Commission 
also recruited more High Court and Court of Appeal judges and advertised vacancies 
expected to be filled by early 2012. This is expected to improve the capacity of the 
Judiciary in dealing with its workload and to reduce its case backlog. JSC has also 
proposed landmark measures to improve the welfare of judicial officers by making 
provisions for loans and mortgages.24 
 
71. Measures to build the capacity of the Judiciary are also underway. The Judicature 
Amendment Bill, 2011, is expected to increase the Court of Appeal judges from 12 to 30 
and those of the High Court from 70 to 15025in order to ease the backlog of cases and 
speed up review of disputes. 
 
72. Vetting of sitting judges and magistrates will start in January 2012. After a case 
challenging vetting of judges was dismissed in September 2011,26 the Vetting of Judges 
and Magistrates Board issued a notice calling for public views on judges and 
magistrates. Parliament also received two names of foreign Judges nominated by the 
Principals to serve on the vetting board.  
 
73. Between October and December 2011, the President assented to the Independent 
Policing Oversight Authority Act, 2011, setting the stage for civilian oversight of the 
police. At the same time, the process of choosing the first Inspector General of police 
commenced with the selection panel interviewing applicants for positions in the 
National Police Service Commission.27 The Selection Panel shortlisted 11candidates for 
                                                
24 “Judiciary Staff Get Sh20 Million Mortgage Plan,” Daily Nation, 11 December 2011 
25 “Bill Increasing Number of Judges to Be Tabled This Week,” Daily Nation, 11 December 2011 
26  ‘Daily Nation, 19 November 2011 
27 Inadequate applications from the administration police for membership to the Commission. This has forced 
the panel to re-advertise the position and invite more applications from retired officers. ‘AP fail to apply for 
police commission posts’ Standard, 23 November 2011 
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the position of chair of the National Police Service Commission. Once formed, the 
commission will recruit a new Inspector General and two deputies. 
 
74. During the period, it was also reported that the internal affairs unit of the police force 
had been set up and will be managed by both Administrative and Regular police.28 The 
internal affairs unit is supposed to handle internal complaints. The Kenya Institute of 
Education is conducting a Training Needs Assessment for the police. A new code of 
conduct developed by the police has been promulgated.29 
Land Reforms  
75. Agenda item 4 had identified land reforms as critical to securing sustainable peace and 
stability in Kenya. The national land policy is anchored in the constitution. Some 
stakeholders are worried about slow progress in land reforms. They argue that vested 
interests and corrupt officials are slowing reforms. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Lands 
has established the Land Reforms Transformation Unit, which stakeholders say is weak 
and does not have sufficient autonomy.30 The unit was meant to lead the land reform 
process pending the establishment of the National Land Commission. Secondly, the 
Ministry of Lands started piloting how to computerise a land information management 
system. The pilot program was to be carried out in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and 
Thika. The results have not been encouraging. 31 
 
76. The Ministry of Lands has been preparing draft legislation but non-state actors pulled 
out of the process in September 2011, accusing ministry officials of not consulting 
adequately and lacking commitment to reforms32. The other concern is that the 
legislative process on land is uncoordinated, as every line ministry handling related 
issues works separately without reference to each other.33 Coordination is constrained 
by practical factors and vested interests in the sector.34 
 
77. The limited progress is also reflected in people’s responses. Only 35 per cent of survey 
respondents think the government has performed well in dealing with land problems in 
the country. A significant 61 per cent are of the view that the government has not done 
well. Similarly, 31 per cent of Kenyans feel the government has done enough to deal 
with land related conflicts while 62 per cent feel the government has not done enough. 
                                                
28 Remarks by a member of the Police Reform Implementation Committee in a roundtable meeting to discuss 
police reforms, 10 November 2011 
29 ibid 
30 Interview with a member of the civil society, 4October 2011  
31 ibid 
32 Memorandum by Land Sector Non State Actors to the ministry of lands titled “continued engagement with 
the ministry of lands on land reforms” September 30, 2011: the CSOs demanded a clear reform roadmap and 
reorganisation of the Land Reforms Transformation Unit to give it autonomy 
33 Interview with a civil society executive working in the land sector, 4 October2011 
34 See Daily Nation, Page 13, 14 October, 2011 
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This may suggest that land related conflict is the most serious issue Kenyans associate 
with the phrase “land problems”. 
 
Figure 11: Do you think the Coalition Government is doing enough to solve conflicts over 
land in Kenya (total) 
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78. Most Kenyans want the government to repossess irregularly acquired land, public or 
otherwise. An overwhelming 85 percent of respondents said they wanted the 
government to repossess any land that was allocated irregularly while 83 percent 
wanted the government to repossess any public land that was acquired irregularly. 
 
79. When asked about what they felt was the most important thing the government needed 
to do to address land related problems in their area, 36 per cent of respondents said 
there was need to issue genuine title deeds, 11 per cent wanted clear land boundaries 
while another 6 per cent cited the need to set up land dispute resolution boards at 
divisional level.  
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Table 6: Name the most important thing the government can do to address land problems 
in your area 
Issue genuine title deeds 36% 
There's no land problem in this area 23% 
Set clear land boundaries 11% 
Stop corruption in land office 7% 
Set up land dispute boards at division level 6% 
Offer land to the landless 5% 
Reconcile communities 4% 
DK 4% 
Support traditional land dispute resolution mechanisms 2% 
Establish nations land commission 1% 
 
80. Key stakeholders in the land sector feel the government has been slow on land 
reforms.35 The National Land Commission, which is created at Article 67 of the 
Constitution, should have been in place by 26 August, 2011 and the office of the 
Commissioner of Lands disbanded and its functions taken over by the National Land 
Commission. Delays have been attributed to internal resistance by vested interests in 
the land sector, including alleged corruption cartels.36 In the December survey, only 9 
per cent of Kenyans felt the government had implemented land reforms well. This 
means the majority of Kenyans felt land reform was not on track. Just 12 per cent felt 
the government had done well in protecting the rights of land owners everywhere.  
 
                                                
35 Letter by civil society groups to the Ministry of Lands, September 2011 
36 A letter by non-state actors to Parliament on the land question, 6October 2010 
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Figure 12: I am going to read out some statements in relations to land in Kenya. Please 
state your level of agreement 
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Figure 13: I am going to read out some statements on land issues, please tell me if you 
agree with them. 
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Conclusion 
 
81. The constitution implementation process so far has stayed the course, with all requisite 
legal and institutional frameworks in place. However, campaigns for the next General 
Election will divert attention, energy and resources from the implementation process 
and even reduce the opportunity for brave reforms if cautionary measures are not put 
in place. If leaders begin to politicize some of the processes and demand amendments 
that would remove important planks from the constitution, then implementation will 
be in disarray. These efforts could reduce the momentum for constitution 
implementation.   
 
82. Preparations to usher in the devolved system of government appear constrained by lack 
of consensus on some key provisions of necessary laws. Delays in finalizing these Bills 
could affect the process of laying a solid foundation for the county governments. 
Further, these delays could result in critical Bills being rushed for debate without 
adequate scrutiny and public participation. Vested interests within the national 
government are resisting the full establishment of a devolved structure of government. 
These attempts include the proposed amendment to do away with the Senate, the 
setting up of perceived parallel structures that could destabilise the county 
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governments and the slow pace at which relevant measures for setting up these 
governments.  
 
83. To have a solid foundation for the devolved system of government, preparations should 
be completed by the time of the next General Election. The county governments will be 
introduced at once. Preparations should be completed and anchored on a solid legal 
and policy framework. 
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3. THE COALITION, ELECTORAL REFORMS AND PREPAREDNESS  
 
Introduction 
 
84. A review of the Coalition government in regard to internal cohesion is a useful starting 
point for a discussion on preparedness for the next general elections. The holding 
together of the Coalition government and in particular the demonstration of ability of 
leaders to transcend ethnic and political cleavages for the purpose of promoting 
national good is very critical at this stage. This report emphasises the need for the 
Coalition to hold together and for the leaders to demonstrate ‘unity of purpose’ because 
parochial divisions can fail the country yet again.  
 
85. There a number of political developments that have taken place that are an issue of 
worry in this regard. Notably debate on the merits and demerits of constitutional 
amendments proposed by the cabinet, the discourses on election date, which is itself 
also a subject of amendment to the constitution, aroused divisiveness and acrimonious 
debate in parliament37. Although the Supreme Court is expected to rule on what, 
constitutionally, should be the precise election date in January 2012, it bears mention 
that the debate has so far demonstrated the lack of preparedness among political 
parties and political leaders, and even candidates for the different elections. Some 
prefer a date when they are individually secure or prepared rather than a date that 
secures the constitutional and the political well being of the country. 
 
86. Related to the divisions causing incoherence within the Coalition is the debate on the 
ICC process and confirmation of charges. This is one issue that fractured the Coalition 
as well as the political parties themselves. How the Coalition government in its entirety 
treat the ICC process and the outcome could have implications for the running of the 
government. And given the propensity to frame the ICC intervention as an election 
agenda, it is possible the outcome will have implications that will spill over to the 
electoral process. Political alliances will form and fragment along new lines. These 
alone will could weaken the foundation of the Coalition government if mitigation 
measures are not established and applied at the outset. 
Power Sharing and securing of politics 
 
87. The preceding discussion has highlighted how the phenomenon of horse trading and 
compromising the appointment procedures has continued to feature in the process of 
establishing new constitutional offices. Previous reports also noted that the formation 
of the Coalition Government was not an end in itself but a vehicle for reforming State 
institutions through necessary laws and institutional reforms. In its formative years, 
disputes in the coalition focused on power and control, creating an image of ‘two-
governments-in-one’. As it matured, the nature and extent of disputes changed. While 
political elite and their respective parties openly lobby and canvass for their candidates 
                                                
3737 See Capital FM News, December 22, 2011: MPs Go on Recess Amid Finance Bill Row 
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for recruitment to senior positions in government, the Principals appear to quietly 
horse-trade and share public positions between their preferred choices.  
 
88. The trend has raised fears that the executive may be infusing the old culture of 
patronage into the new constitutional dispensation. This is rapidly undermining open 
and competitive hiring processes. Horses trading even where recruitment is 
competitive and transparent also risks embracing political suitability rather than merit. 
It will have the effect of compromising and undercutting the integrity of new 
institutions. But there is general reluctance to engage, in a constructive manner, the 
subject of ethnicity and skewed composition of public sector institutions.38 
 
89. The Coalition has not had open disagreements between the two Principals. Kenyans are 
also happy with relationship between the Principals: most Kenyans are satisfied with 
the working relationship between the President and Prime Minister, who have 
managed to project an image of unity: 
 
Table 7: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the relationship between President 
Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga? 
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90. The show of unity, is, however, not deep. Political undercurrents and an aura of 
competition and mistrust inform the manner in which they address policy issues and 
                                                
38 An article by a commissioner of the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission, which raised 
concern about the skewed nature of sharing of senior positions in the public sector, raised debate that failed to 
engage the subject candidly. People debated on basis of ethnic identity. 
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how technocrats from both parties relate to each other and with either Principal. 
Suspicions and mistrust are usually demonstrated every time an issue of ‘who should 
take responsibility for the post-election violence’ comes to the fore.39 Further, although 
mutual political tolerance has thawed the frosty relations and public altercations over 
time, occassional tensions at cabinet level and between technocrats assigned to each of 
the Coaltion partners intercept Cohesion. Some have been protesting alleged 
interferrence of their ministerial dockets by colleagues, a pointer that there is need to 
insulate the coalition from divisions that could spill to the electoral process.40 Such 
public protests are symptomatic of the fractious nature of the government. Mutual 
suspicion, lack of cohesion and pursuit of sectarian interests undermine the 
functioning of the coalition government.  
 
91. Asked what they like most about the Coalition government, about one third said they 
liked nothing at all. Qualitative interviews across Kenya found that although Kenyans 
were happy the coalition government had promulgated a new constitution after 
decades of reform and restored peace after the 2007 political crisis, it remained 
unresponsive to the everyday needs of ordinary citizens.  
 
Table 8: What do you like most about the coalition government? 
What do you like most about the coalition government? 
Nothing 30% 
Gave us a new constitution 24% 
Brought peace and reconciliation after the 2008 post election 
violence 
22% 
Brought checks and balances in government 8% 
Improved infrastructure 9% 
Fighting corruption 2% 
Economy has improved 2% 
 
92. As noted earlier in the report, the coalition government’s apparent inability to rein in 
rising inflation and resultant high commodity prices has bred public resentment and 
perception that politicians are only interested in pursuing vested interests. In the latest 
survey, majority of the respondents in all parts of the country are unhappy with the 
high commodity prices.   
 
                                                
39 For instance, some argue that comments by the Prime Minister that the President should take personal 
responsibility for police killings in the post-election violence sparked outrage from PNU members and caused 
strained relations among the Coalition partners for a while. 
40 ‘Nyong’o Protests to the President Over VP’ Daily Nation, 26 October 2011 
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Figure 14: What do you dislike most about the coalition government? 
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93. An analysis of survey data over time shows that public disenchantment with the 
Coalition government has been growing.  Whereas Kenyans were initially dismayed by 
frequent political bickering and jostling for control, the government’s failure to fight 
corruption, the prevalence of high levels of unemployment and perceived lack of 
commitment to implement the constitution, promote reconciliation, protecting rights 
and resettle the displaced alienated the public from the government. In particular, the 
steady rise of high food prices and lack of lack of cohesion on how to address pressing 
issues of public concern eroded the sense of protection. By the end of 2010, majority of 
Kenyans said they would not like the to have another coalition government:       
 
Table 9: Is power sharing between political parties in government something you would 
like to see after another election? (Dec 2010) 
Is power sharing between political parties in government something you would 
like to see after another election? (Dec 2010) 
No 75% 
Yes 21% 
DK 4% 
 
94. As the next general elections approach, lack of civic engagement with the government 
is low. The perception of the state as a predatory mechanism that does not respond to 
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the livelihood and physical security of the population has increased public detachment 
and dependence on the coalition government. As reported in earlier review reports, 
increased fascination of the unemployed youth with organised criminal gangs and 
other extractive extra-state organs portend security risk as the next general elections 
approach.    
 
95. The Principals have had difficulties mobilising MPs to collectively support government 
agenda in parliament. In this quarter, they failed to persuade MPs to drop drastic 
amendments to the Finance Bill even after hosting them for an informal meeting.41 The 
proposed amendments seek to, among other things, control the banking sector by 
imposing a ceiling on how much interest banks can charge on loans. The Executive is 
however opposed to this amendment, arguing that this could interfere with the 
operations of the sector in a liberalised market.  The principals could also not rally MPs 
into supporting their three nominees to Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
(EACC). They nominated candicates for vetting and approval, but the parliamentary 
Justice and Legal Affairs Committee rejected the nominees.  
 
96. Besides apparent politicisation of the war against corruption, 42 there is concern that 
the political culture in Kenya is far from adopting the values enshrined in the new 
constitution. Political violence witnessed during the party nominations suggests that 
the threat of electoral violence remains real as we approach the next general elections. 
However, the enactment of the Political Parties Act, 2011 is  a significant step towards 
reforming the country’s political culture and institutionalising political parties.43  
 
97. But political parties also appear to be a problem; they are yet to institutionalise and 
become viable vehicles the democratisation process. They are yet to develop party 
ideologies and policies. In other words, the parties have not evolved as good political 
institutions. And because of lack of institutionalisation, they are hardly prepared for 
the elections. They would prefer an election date that is convenient for them rather 
than a date that is constitutionally and politically relevant for the country. 
 
98. The constitution promulgated in August 2010 forms a firm foundation for the 
forthcoming General Election. But the constitution provides largely for a First Past the 
Post electoral system, or a winne- tak-all framework that locks out the losers from 
power. The Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 General Election (Headed  by Judge 
JohannKriegler) recommended an overhaul of the electoral system and changes in  the 
manner in which politics is conducted. It also recommended the establishement of an 
acceptable conflict resolution mechanism to arbitrate disputes arising from elections 
and party nominations. The envisaged reforms, therefore,should be viewed not simply 
in terms of making voting fairer, but making politics in Kenya more relevant for a 
healthy and accountable democratic order 
 
99. The country has made key steps in undertaking electoral reforms in readiness for the 
next General Election. The IEBC commissioners were competitively hired after a 
rigorous vetting exercise. They have assumed office and have been giving regular 
                                                
41 “MPs refuse to toe Kibaki, Raila line,” Standard, 21 December 2011 
42 “PM Told to Resign Over Jobs Scandal” Daily Nation 23 October 2011 
43 Interview with a former civil society activist who is now an official of a political party, December, 2011 
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updates on how the commission is preparing for the next General Election. Asked 
whether they think the country is prepared for the next General Election, as many as 77 
per cent of respondents answered in the affirmative. Only 16 per cent said the country 
is not prepared. 
 
Figure 15: In your opinion, do you think the country is prepared to hold the next General 
Election? (total) 
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100. This section thus looks at the steps the country has taken in preparing for the elections. 
The analysis focuses broadly on election preparedness, hence providing an opportunity 
to point out a range of electoral and development challenges that may affect the quality 
and perception of elections. 
Setting a Conducive Environment for a Successful Electoral Process 
 
101. Managing elections effectively requires an effective legal framework that is 
unambiguous, understandable and transparent --one that addresses all components of 
an electoral system necessary to ensure democratic elections.44 The Constitution, the 
IEBC Act, the Elections Act and the Political Parties Act set clear guidelines and 
timeframes within which various obligations are to be met to ensure a free and fair 
election. A breach of any of these provisions has the potential to invite serious legal 
challenges. 
 
102. To a large extent, the constitution has settled the question of the electoral system and 
                                                
44IDEA (2002).International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of 
Elections (Stockholm: International IDEA) p. 11. 
42  
  
 
the manner of holding elections. The constitution provides for a plurality-majority 
design for some elections: it provides for a two-round system in the presidential 
elections in case there is no candidate who gets a 50 percent plus one vote; and a first-
past-the-post (FPTP) system with quotas for the national assembly, the senate and 
county assemblies. It also establishes requirements for registration as a voter; 
establishes a new election management body; lays down criteria for the delimitation of 
electoral units; restructures key elective offices in the executive and the legislature; and 
establishes standards for the formation and management of political parties. 
 
103. Uncertainty on some constitutional provisions: Uncertainty about some electoral 
provisions in the constitution, especially on the date when elections must be held, has 
led to suggestions of amendments to the constitution that are likely to have 
implications for preparations for the next elections. The pending issues need to be 
settled as soon as possible. The more a decision is delayed, the more it will strain IEBC 
timelines for preparing and holding the elections. Delays in deciding the election date 
could also increase public anxiety on the schedule of the next General Election.  
 
104. Critical laws on elections and transition to counties not passed: It is also notable that 
critical Bills touching on the General Election and transition to the county governments 
have not been enacted. Key among these is legislation on vacation of office of member 
of County Assembly and legislation on the removal of county governors. The Campaign 
Finance Bill is currently being discussed by the Commission on the Implementation of 
the Constitution. The Bill aims to safeguard against the use of illegal resources to 
promote the interests of candidates or political parties in nomination and election 
campaigns. It seeks to cap the amount of money a politician can use in an election as 
well as put an end to the exploitation of political incumbency, especially through the 
use of public resources in campaigns. Aside from laws, political will and coherence 
within government is necessary for a peaceful transition.45 
 
105. IEBC enforcing the political parties and elections laws: The Political Parties Act came 
into effect on 2 November 2011 and the Elections Act a month later, setting off a 
rigorous timeline within which political parties and candidates must adjust to comply 
with various legal requirements. Some provisions in the two laws are already effective 
and are being enforced by IEBC. For example, political candidates can no longer hold 
fundraising events (harambees) until after the 2012 elections since the Elections Act 
2011 prohibits anyone aspiring for political office from participating in a fundraising 
event eight months before the election.46 To effectively enforce this provision, the IEBC 
intends to set up a committee to monitor the candidates.47 Section 43(5) of the 
Elections Act also requires any public officer who intends to contest an election to 
resign at least seven months before that election. The IEBC has given notice to public 
officers keen on seeking elective posts that they have until 14 January to vacate 
offices.48 These are welcome measures since enforcement of the electoral laws has been 
the weak link in the management of elections in the country. 
                                                
45 Interview with an official from the Commission on Implementation of the Constitution, 21 November 2011 
46 “Early rules set for candidates for elections,” http://www.iiec.or.ke/index.php/early-rules-set-for-public-
officers-seeking-elective-posts.html 
47 Ibid  
48 Ibid 
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106. The IEBC has also directed councillors to declare their wealth or risk being barred from 
contesting in the next General Election. This is a significant development since it aims 
to promote accountability as provided for in the Public Officer Ethics Act. However, 
this directive needs to apply to all elective positions. Most importantly, there should be 
a provision to allow for making the wealth declaration public because that is the best 
way to enforce scrutiny and enhance accountability. 
 
107. Political parties have started complying with the law: Some political parties have 
started taking measures to institute discipline and prevent party hopping as intended 
by the Political Parties Act. Some have started disciplinary proceedings against their 
members who have violated the Political Parties Act. “Parties are being funded by 
taxpayers and one way to be accountable is [by] adhering to the law.”49There are also 
others that have changed their party constitutions to bar public office holders from 
holding party offices as required by the law. However, full compliance with the Political 
Parties Act and election laws is still being challenged by the lack of awareness among 
the political parties on their new obligations.50 
 
108. Already, there are quite a number of efforts by various CSOs to build the capacities of 
political parties in terms of accountability, internal democracy, building integrity of the 
party leaders and restoring political parties as credible institutions.51 There have been 
other initiatives such as appraising political parties’ performance as well as training 
officials to develop strategic plans that will help them to implement their objectives and 
to be more accountable to members. All of these efforts are happening in partnership 
with the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and the IEBC.  
 
109. However, these capacity building and awareness creation efforts need to be enhanced. 
When asked during the survey what they think is the most important thing that 
political parties can do to be strong organizations, 26 per cent of respondents say they 
should not be founded on ethnic grounds. Another 15 per cent felt that parties needed 
to keep promises made during campaigns as the second most important thing that they 
should do to be strong organizations. 
 
                                                
49 Interview with Safina Secretary General, 11 November 2011 
50 Interview with Secretary General of a political party, 11 November 2011 
51 Interview with a civil society leader, 25 October 2011 
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Figure 16: Please tell me two important things that political parties can do to be strong 
political organisations. 
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110. In order to serve Kenyans better, 23 per cent of respondents said they wanted political 
parties to preach peace and reconciliation; 16 per cent wanted them to implement their 
manifestos. 
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Figure 17: Please mention one thing that political parties can do to serve Kenyans better 
(total) 
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111. The political stability of any country and rule of law is largely underpinned by 
institutionalized political parties that are disciplined. The rationale for the Political 
Parties Act is, therefore, to help parties to grow as institutions that adhere to 
democratic practices. However, the party system is yet to take root. Maintaining 
discipline within political parties is proving to be one of the biggest threats to their 
institutionalization. Membership and commitment to political parties in Kenya is still 
largely on the basis of tribal affiliation as opposed to ideology.  
 
112. Office of the Registrar of Political Parties still vacant: Despite the coming into force of 
the Political Parties Act in November 2011, the Office of the Registrar of Political 
Parties has not been filled. This is partly attributable to the protracted differences in 
the parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, which has been 
immobilised for several months.52Recruitment processes for the Registrar of Political 
Parties still remain in abeyance, yet the office of the registrar is charged with ensuring 
full compliance with the Political Parties Act. 
                                                
52 ‘Bickering in House team stalls political parties registrar vetting.’ Daily Nation, 30 November 2011 
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Managing Elections Competently and Inspiring Public Trust in the Electoral 
Process 
113. During the previousreview report, we noted that it is important to ensure, from the 
outset, that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission is perceived as 
independent, fair, competent and impartial. The preceding section has also noted that 
as many as 77 per centof the survey respondents have confidence inthe IEBC going into 
elections. Important in this respect also is that the IEBC has already started preparing 
for the polls. The commission has released a timeline of what needs to be done to 
ensure free and fair elections as stipulated in the constitution. 
 
114. Most Kenyans want to see a transparent electoral process as a way of ensuring free and 
fair elections. Kenyans also want to see an end to voter bribery and security provided 
during the electoral period. 
 
Figure 18: In your opinion, what is the most important thing to ensure free and fair 
elections? (total) 
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115. The preliminary report of the boundaries delimitation is to be released in January 2012 
and the entire demarcation exercise is supposed to be completed within four months – 
by April 2011. Voter registration will then take place thereafter while the process of 
establishing the administrative mechanisms necessary for the elections are also 
proceeding concurrently.53 
                                                
53 Remarks by IEBC chairman during the 3rd KNDR conference, 5 December 2011 
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116. Challenges in sequencing activities: Most processes for required actions before the 
2012 elections are sequential and can only start once the preceding one is complete.54 If 
there is a delay in one process, it also means a delay in the other processes, hence 
affecting the entire preparations for elections. For example, Section 28 of the Elections 
Act, 2011 requires registered political parties to submit their party membership lists to 
the Registrar of Political Parties at least three months before they nominate their 
candidates. The IEBC is required by sections 16 and 17 of the Elections Act to receive 
party nominations at least 21 days before an election. Political parties cannot, however, 
submit a list of members if voter registration is not complete and the register has not 
been verified. These are statutory processes with strict deadlines that need to be 
followed. 
 
117. Use of ICTs to be enhanced: The Interim Independent Electoral Commissionembraced 
information technology in the electoral process by setting up a modern system for 
collection, collation, transmission and tallying of electoral data. It must be noted that 
the speedy transmission of election results is critical for confidence building among 
voters sincedelays tend to cause anxiety. The progressive use of technology in the 
electoral process needs to be enhanced and institutionalised. Certain laws, policies, 
structures and guidelines to make ICTseffective should be among IEBC’s priorities. 
Issues relating to compatibility, security, sustainability and appropriateness of the 
selected technology should be a major consideration. 
 
118. K-NICE to provide integrated voter and civic education: The government, through the 
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, has developed a national plan for civic 
education – the ‘Kenya National Integrated Civic Education’ (K-NICE) programme, 
meant to educate Kenyans on provisions of the constitution. This is critical in 
facilitating the much needed public awareness as the country heads towards the 
General Election. The programme is inclusive and provides an integrated national 
approach towards civic education that brings together both state and non-state actors 
in order to ensure sustainability, consistency and national coverage. It is hoped that 
this civic education will be driven by demand and supply mostly in enhancing new 
values in both the national and county governments.55 
 
119. National voter education curriculum drafted: The IEBC through the Kenya Institute of 
Education (KIE) has developed a National Voter Education curriculum that will be a 
reference text for all organisations involved in voter education in the country.56 The 
development process involved extensive consultations with relevant government 
ministries and non-state actors in voter/civic education. The curriculum was developed 
in line with the new constitution and is intended for use in schools. It will serve as a 
quality check mechanism for civic education in the country. Indeed, concern has been 
raised about the different manuals being used by the various civic education providers 
without any quality checks.57 
 
                                                
54 Remarks by IEBC chairman during the 3rd KNDR conference, 5 December 2011 
55 Interview with a council member of K-NICE, 10 November 2011 
56 Interview with a council member of K-NICE, 10 November 2011 
57 Remarks by a CIC commissioner during a public forum to discuss devolution, 14 November 2011 
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120. Electoral malpractices still go unpunished: The old political habits of violence, vote 
buying and voter bribery, among other malpractices, are still very much alive in the 
political arena. Furthermore, perpetrators are still not being punished. This was 
evident during the Kitutu Masaba by-election, the first to be held by the IEBC. There 
were reports of violence, assault and voter bribery but the IEBC has not taken any 
action on these offences.58 Election-related violence has also been reported in Rongo, 
Migori County. Electoral violence can be addressed only if there is recognition of the 
problem and the political commitment to fight impunity and respect the rule of law.  
 
121. As the next General Election approaches, it is important that the electoral body sends a 
strong signal that electoral offences will not be tolerated.  Given its expanded mandate 
and powers, the IEBC can now make it part of its business to punish political parties 
that perpetrate or engage in electoral malpractices. Further, the IEBC should engage 
with political parties and politicians to design a process that will incorporate 
accountability for political and electoral violence as part of its regulatory mandate. 
Settling Electoral Disputes Efficiently and Effectively 
122. The importance of an effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism is recognised by 
the constitution which,inArticle 87 (1), creates an obligation on Parliament to enact 
legislation for the timely settlement of electoral disputes. The IEBC Act in Section 4 (e) 
empowers the commissionto be responsible for “the settlement of electoral disputes, 
including disputes relating to or arising from nominations, but excluding election 
petitions and disputes subsequent to the declaration of election results.” This provision 
is restated in Section 74 of the Elections Act, 2011, which empowers the IEBC to make 
regulations to “provide for complaints resolution mechanisms and for the manner of 
settlement of electoral disputes.” 
 
123. So far, the Political Parties Tribunal and the Registrar of Political parties have managed 
to arbitrate disputes between NARC Kenya and other Party of National Unityaffiliates 
over the sharing of the coalition’sshare of the political parties funding; the Social 
Democractic Party dispute over its leadership and the FORD Kenya dispute over its 
grassroots elections, among other cases. It is encouraging that political parties are 
seeking arbitration from the relevant organs for peaceful resolution of their differences.  
 
124. However, there is some lack of clarityoverthe jurisdiction of the High Court and that of 
the Political Parties Tribunal. While some politicians have rushed to the High Court to 
have their cases heard and decided, other political players argue that the courts would 
be overstepping their mandate if they determined such cases without first establishing 
whether or not they had been raised at the tribunal. For them, it was necessary for the 
courts to stay away from such disputes as that would create conflict between 
established systems.59 There is thus need to emphasise  the role of the respective 
organs on the management of disputes touching on political parties in order to 
streamline mandates for timely and clear institutional responses. 
                                                
58 Interview with an electoral officer in Kitutu Masaba, 28 November 2011; “Magara attacked as voting starts in 
Kitutu Masaba,” Standard, 28 November 2011 
59 Interview with Safina Secretary General, 11 November 2011 
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Conclusion 
 
125. The country is increasing its preparedness for the 2012 General Election.The legal 
framework is in place, but civic and voter education are yet to roll out in a 
comprehensive manner. Measures to institutionalise political parties are also yet to be 
deepened. Enforcement of the Political Parties Act is yet to show. 
 
126. Elections are a complex and challenging undertaking that require the cooperation and 
support of all stakeholders. Trust needs to be built among electoral stakeholders, 
particularly political parties, the media and civil society, which can only be achieved 
throughcontinuous engagement. Political leadership at all levels must work together to 
achieve a credible process that enjoys the confidence of all people. Application of the 
law and punishment of those who err is what can bring discipline and demonstrate a 
break with the past.  
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4. THE LEGACY OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE: THE ICCAND IDPs 
 
Introduction 
 
127. The previous four review reports have shown that failure to address impunity for the 
post-election violence has remained a sore point in the reform process. It remains the 
main indicator of failure to change Kenya’s political culture. It has undermined peace 
and reconciliation and presents a real threat to a peaceful transition in 2012. Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been unable to return to places from which they were 
displaced either due to a deeper problem of landlessness or largely due to failure to 
restore social cohesion. 
 
128. Observing the pattern of violence every five-year electoral cycle and the ensuing 
impunity, the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV, chaired 
by appeal court judge Philip Waki),  recommended the setting up of a Special Tribunal 
for Kenya to investigate and prosecute suspected perpetrators of crimes committed 
during the crisis period. It also recommended handing over the matter to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) if Kenya failed to set up the Tribunal.   
 
129. As the country transits to 2012 and begins preparations for the next General Election, 
the legacy of 2007 hangs over the population. On 15 December 2010, the ICC Chief 
Prosecutor named six persons suspected to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes 
committed during the post-election violence (PEV). The judges of there-Trial Chamber 
are expected to rule on whether or not to confirm these charges in January 2012.60 The 
confirmation of charges has far-reaching political implications for 2012. This section of 
the report looks at public perceptions of the ICC involvement in the Kenya situation 
and implications for peace and stability ahead of 2012. It also examines progress in 
addressing the problem of IDPs and promoting reconciliation.  
 
Reactions to the ICC investigations 
 
130. The confirmation of charges hearings at The Hague drew widespread public interest in 
rural and urban areas. The testimonies and cross-examination sessions elicited much 
public debate about the evidence presented and arguments made, as Kenyans 
speculated on possible outcomes. Since the end of the hearings, discussion on the ICC 
process in Kenya has significantly reduced. Lack of robust debate may be attributed to 
anxiety the process has engendered among the suspects and their supporters. ‘The 
suspects and their lawyers put up a good fight; there is not much more to say except 
wait for the ruling.’61 The lull may also be attributed to apprehension about the 
implications of the confirmation of charges for the political careers of individual 
politicians and the communities they represent. The outcome will determine how 
politicians and their supporters align ahead of the elections.62 
 
                                                
60‘ Ocampo six to know their fate on the same day’ Daily Nation 26 October 2011. See also www.icc.cpi.int 
61 Interview with an elder in Eldoret, 4 November 2011 
62 Interview with a university lecturer in Nairobi, 17 December 2011 
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131. Asked what they thought would happen if the ICC failed to prosecute any suspect, as 
many as 31 per cent of respondents thought nothing would happen while 25 per cent 
said there might be violence. Yet others said the matter of ‘whose’ charges are 
confirmed or dropped would determine public reactions. ‘The suspects do not have 
equal weight. Kenyans don’t care whether some cases are confirmed or dropped; 
actually Kenyans are looking at the two presidential candidates only.’63 
 
Figure 19: What do you think is most likely to happen if the ICC fails to prosecute any 
suspects for post-election violence? (total) 
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132. Important in this respect is that public support for the ICC remains high. Up to 64 per 
cent of those interviewed said they were happy that the ICC was pursuing the six 
suspects. The level of public support for the ICC intervention over time has remained 
over 50 per cent, but support has been on increase from June 2011. 
 
Table 10: Are you happy or unhappy that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects? 
Are you happy or unhappy that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects? 
 Dec 11 Oct 11 Sept 11 June 11 
Happy 64% 62% 65% 51% 
Unhappy 32% 28% 31% 38% 
Don’t care 5% 5% 4% 5% 
                                                
63 Interview with a university student, Bungoma, 8 December 2011 
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Figure 20: Are you happy or unhappy that The Hague/the ICC is pursuing the six suspects 
of the post-election violence (PEV)? (by region) 
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133. The majority (46%) of those who are happy with the ICC intervention said it would 
bring justice to victims, while 22 per cent said it would end impunity. Another 15 per 
cent said the investigation would help bring out the truth about the post-election 
violence. Interestingly, only 11 per cent said they thought the ICC could deter future 
violence, and 6 per cent noted that Kenyan courts are still not to be trusted: 
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Figure 21: If happy/very happy/somewhat happy, please explain your answer. (total) 
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134. Those who are unhappy with the ICC intervention argue for a local mechanism, 
including the existing courts (21%) or a Special Tribunal (6%). However, more people 
are concerned about the selection of cases, saying the list of six is incomplete as it 
leaves out other known suspects and the six are not the real suspects. Others regret the 
lack of exhaustive investigations and the politicisation of the ICC process. 
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Figure 22: If unhappy/not very happy/not happy at all, please explain your answer. 
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135. In earlier phases of the investigation, there was concern that indictment of some of the 
suspects would trigger retaliatory violence. However, successive surveys have shown 
that in all parts of the country, significant majority believe that violence is highly 
unlikely to occur regardless of the outcome of the confirmation of charges. 
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Figure 23: If ICC trials take place, how likely do you think it is to produce violence? (total) 
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136. A comparison over time, however, shows that the number of those who think violence 
is likely to occur has steadily increased. For instance, only 23 per cent considered the 
possibility of violence in October 2011 compared to 36 per cent in December 2011. The 
shift may be attributed to local discourses of victimisation. In many parts of the 
country, perceptions that the six suspects ‘are not the ones who bear the greatest 
responsibility’ continue to dominate public debate on the ICC process.  
 
137. The 36 per cent who think violence is likely to occur attribute their fears to a number of 
factors. The most important of these include: to express solidarity with suspects in 
their strongholds, protest because no action has been taken against other perpetrators, 
and to revenge against those supporting the ICC. 
 
Table 11: If violence is likely, why? 
If very/somewhat likely, why do you think violence will occur? 
To express solidarity with politicians in their strongholds 37% 
Because no action has been taken against perpetrators of PEV 29% 
To revenge against those supporting the ICC 22% 
Because of unresolved land issues 4% 
I don't know 3% 
Due to tribalism 2% 
Because the listing of the 6 PEV suspects was politicised 2% 
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138. As concerns about retaliatory violence increase, intimidation of witnesses continues to 
be reported.64 The ICC’s Head of Jurisdiction, Complementarity and cooperation 
division, while on an official visit to Kenya, stated that tougher sanctions would be 
taken against any suspect who was found to be intimidating witnesses.65 
 
139. The fear of violence in the wake of ICC trials suggests that Kenyans are yet to embrace 
and value the concept of fighting impunity. The discourse that those who support the 
ICC should be punished has obscured debate on impunity and ethnicised the ICC 
process. The perception that the government is unwilling to conduct genuine 
investigations and try all suspects at all levels further entrenches impunity and creates 
conditions for future violence: ‘2012 might be worse than 2007 because this time 
nobody will accept to be beaten. Everybody is ready, just in case.’66 
 
140. Increasing impunity and readiness to participate in violence stem from impunity 
among lower level perpetrators. Asked what should be done about youths who carried 
out actual attacks, the majority of respondents said they should be tried through 
existing courts or establish a Special Tribunal for them:  
 
Figure 24: What should be done with the rest of the suspected perpetrators? (by total) 
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141. The fact that 69 per cent of survey respondents call for the prosecution of perpetrators 
suggests that a majority of Kenyans are not happy about impunity. Over the past four 
years, poor investigations resulted in the acquittal of suspects due to lack of sufficient 
                                                
64 The Standard 14 October 2011, ‘Now Ali witness suspended from union’ 
65 The Standard on 18 November 2011, pg 7 ‘Ocampo six warned not to intimidate witnesses” 
66 Interview with a middle-aged man in the Rift Valley, 4 November 2011 
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evidence. Up to 19 per cent of respondents in the Rift Valley suggested forgiveness. 
Asked what would be the best way to prevent violence, only 6 per cent said the 
perpetrators should be prosecuted. This is interesting considering the high support for 
the ICC and the recommendation that other perpetrators be tried through a local 
process. An examination of results over time shows that shortly after the post-election 
violence in 2008, only 1 per cent cited prosecution. However, as people felt safer, the 
figure rose to 72 per cent in 2010. It then began to decline again as the next General 
Election began to approach.  
 
Figure 25:  Most important way to prevent future violence 
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142. Continued support for the ICC derives from the public perception that the government 
is unlikely to conduct genuine investigations and prosecute the suspects.  About four 
years on, the public has not seen a major movement by the government to do so. As a 
result, a majority of respondents across the country are supportive of the prosecution 
of the six suspects. However, some respondents -- mostly from the Rift Valley -- feel 
that the ICC has ‘targeted’ the suspects and their respective communities. 
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The Challenge of Resettling IDPs 
 
143. The past review reports have outlined government efforts to deliver on the resettlement 
of IDPs. Although nearly all camps have since been closed and the bulk of IDPs 
returned to their homes, thousands of landless people who were not able to return to 
their places of origin continue to be displaced. As noted in the last review report, these 
are the so-called ‘self-help groups’ that are waiting to be allocated land by the 
government.  
 
144. During the reporting period, the government recognised the need to urgently resettle 
the remaining IDPs before the next General Election. The Ministry of Lands opened 
bids for the purchase of land to allocate to selected beneficiary households.67Of the 
6,978 families targeted for land allocation, the ministries of Special Programmes, 
Lands and Provincial Administration had settled 2,287 families or 32.7 per cent on 
8,412 acres by the end of 2011.68 
 
145. According to the Ministry of Special Programmes, houses for 1,006 households have 
been constructed for those already allocated land, comprising approximately 44 per 
cent. By the end of 2011, the ministries had procured 8,412 acres of land and an 
additional 5,335.11 was at various stages of procurement.  
 
146. Efforts to procure land are constrained by lack of land suitable for agriculture. Besides, 
where land is available, owners overprice it, making it beyond the reach of allocated 
resources. As noted in the previous review report, resistance to the settlement of 
‘foreigners’ on community land presents a new challenge to IDP resettlement. To 
overcome this challenge, the government has encouraged IDPs to help in identifying 
available land for purchase. The government has also set aside Ksh8 billion for 
resettlement. In the last quarter of 2011, the government set up an inter-ministerial 
task force to expedite the resettlement of IDPs in the shortest time possible. 
 
147. Previous review reports have highlighted the challenges to finding durable solutions for 
IDPs, particularly because of structural challenges of landlessness and poverty. Ever 
increasing family sizes as displaced children turn into adults and form their own 
families means giving land is not a sustainable strategy in the long term. At the same 
time, addressing landlessness only among the displaced --the majority of whom are 
members of one community --breeds resentment among other landless persons who 
may not be displaced. It undermines peace and reconciliation because it creates a sense 
of official favouritism and exploitation of vulnerability caused by displacement to make 
undue claims for land allocation and other assistance.   
 
148. From this perspective, land allocation to IDPs and building for them houses on the 
allocated land, even after some have already received Ksh 10,000 start-up funds and 
                                                
67 Presentation by an official from the Lands Office at Pangoni Beach Resort, Mombasa, 30 Sept- 1 Oct 2011. 
The official stated that the ministries of Special Programmes, Lands and Provisional Administration have so 
far settled 2,093 families on 7,008.08 acres of land. Another presenter observed that the MoSSP was 
planning to resettle affected families on 1,000 acres of land donated by a county council. See also ‘The state 
resettles 76 displaced families’The Standard 15 December 2011, p.22 
68 Ministry of Special Programmes, Press Release – Progress on Implementation of the IDPs Resettlement, 
Daily Nation, 23 December, p. 25 
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Ksh 25,000 shelter reconstruction funds, is likely to do harm. Even within the 
displaced community, there are genuine IDPs who have waited four years to receive the 
Ksh 10,000. Therefore, resentment is bound to rise when those waiting hear that 
persons who already received both amounts are now about to be allocated land and 
houses. For those from other communities that perceive disproportionate assistance to 
one side, peace and reconciliation may be hampered.  
 
149. The majority of those interviewed thought IDPs were living in camps due to lack of 
land, while others were waiting for ex-gratia payments from the government: 
 
Table 12: In your opinion, what is the most important reason IDPs remain in camps? 
 
150. That fear of attacks presents a major hindrance to return suggests that social cohesion 
is yet to be achieved in some places.  Indeed, the previous section highlighted the need 
to promote healing and reconciliation as the General Election approaches. The majority 
suggested that the most important way to address internal displacement is to settle 
people wherever land is available.  
 
In your opinion, what is the most important reason IDPs remain in 
camps? 
They lack land 31% 
Waiting for funds from the government 29% 
Fear of attacks 25% 
 
DK/NR/RTA 8% 
IDPs are not genuine 7% 
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Figure 26: What can the government do to address the problem of IDPs? 
43%
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  can	  
find	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They	  should	  be	  resettled	  where	  they	  were	  chased	  from
IDPs	  should	  be	  given	  funds
Preach	  peace	  and	  reconciliation
The	  IDPs	  should	  be	  taken	  back	  to	  their	  ancestral	  lands
Assist	  them	  with	  basic	  needs
None
What	  is	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  that	  the	  government	  can	  do	  to	  
address	  the	  problem	  of	  IDPs	  in	  Kenya?	  (total)
 
 
151. Previous surveys showed that more people wanted IDPs settled where they were 
displaced from. The shift may be indicative of the realisation that return to places of 
origin may not always be possible, especially for landless IDPs. 
Access to Relief and Assistance Funds  
152. The data on disbursements, like most available data on IDPs, is disaggregated only by 
administrative units, not by other factors such as gender, ethnicity, age, etc. It is, 
therefore, difficult to know who the beneficiaries are. Allegations of corruption and 
embezzlement of funds largely stem from lack of reliable data. By the end of December, 
the MoSSP has continued to disburse ex-gratia payments to IDPs, as follows: 
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Table 13:  Disbursement of Ksh 10,000 and Ksh 25,000 
Source: Ministry of Special Programmes, Dec 2011 
 
153. Figures of this type are not very useful for analysis because they do not indicate who 
received what assistance. One of the key findings of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on IDPs69has been that resettlement is characterised by structural 
inequalities, bureaucratic encumbrances and lack of a legal framework to inform 
protection and assistance activities.  There is a lack of clarity about who were counted, 
by whom and when. The process of producing registers was characterised by 
dishonesty, corruption and discrimination. This has resulted in many genuine and 
deserving IDPs being left out of existing lists. Many ‘fake’ IDPs found their way into 
those lists. As a result, those officially registered and recognised exclude many genuine 
IDPs deserving of assistance. 
 
154. In the reporting period, three officials in the MoSSP have been arraigned in court over 
embezzlement of funds allocated to the resettlement process. Other officials in the Rift 
Valley have also been charged in a Nyandarua court for stealing food meant for IDPs in 
camps.70 
 
155. As reported in the previous review report, continued assistance is promoting 
dependency among IDPs. Some observers argue that IDPs are reluctant to reinsert 
                                                
69  Ibid 6  
70 ‘DPP orders arrest of three over graft’ The Star, 5 October 2011, p.5; also ‘Senior officials in the MoSSP to be 
arrested and prosecuted over misappropriation of Sh15 million meant for IDPs between January and May 
2009’, Daily Nation,  10 October 2011 
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themselves into the harsh economic realities in the country characterised by high food 
and commodity prices. 
 
The National Policy on IDPs 
 
156. The Draft National Policy on IDPs completed in early 2010 has been awaiting Cabinet 
approval for more than a year. However, the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Resettlement of IDPs, with support from NGOs, has drafted a Bill on IDPs. The draft 
was debated by civil society organisations and other stakeholders and will be presented 
to the Cabinet for approval in 2012. The Bill will be based on the National Policy, itself 
derived from the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to IDPs, and 
the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of IDPs. 
 
Promoting Healing and Reconciliation  
 
157. Agenda 2 of the KNDR required the Principals to lead measures to promote 
reconciliation in regions affected by the violence. The government established the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission (NCIC) to spearhead peace and reconciliation efforts in the 
country. These were to work in collaboration with existing structures, such as the 
District Steering Groups, the District Peace Committees and the National Steering 
Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management.   
 
158. In the reporting period, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 
continued to hold public hearings in various parts of the country. The commission has 
developed a timetable of its intended public hearings.71 Hearings already conducted in 
the Rift Valley and the Coast highlighted human rights violations during the post-
election violence and historical grievances over land dispossession.72 Criticism has 
continued to hound the TJRC. Civil society organisations have raised concern about its 
methodology and lack of expertise.  Its term of office was extended to April 2012.73 
 
159. Some analysts fear the TJRC report, when completed, might not adequately fulfil its 
mandate. The need to rush through to make up for lost time did not allow for in-depth 
discussion and analysis of issues it was mandated to investigate. For instance, political 
assassinations were allocated two days of public hearings, yet the violations span a 
period of more than 60 years. Two days may not be adequate to bring out a 
representative truth about the violation.74 
 
160. The NCIC has been active in the quarter under review. It intensified its peace initiatives 
in various parts of the country in collaboration with District Peace Committees. In the 
                                                
71 www.tjrc.org  
72 ‘Emotive land issues dominate TJRC’s Narok sittings’, The Star, 3 October 2011, p. 5  
73 ‘TJRC granted a further 6 months extension’ www.tjrckenya.org accessed 29 October 2011 
74 Interview with a human rights defender, 1 October 2011; see also Press Conference by Human Rights Watch 
Group on 27 October 2011, which highlighted the need to not only investigate the Mt Elgon atrocities by 
SDLF but also by the Army. The report, Hold your heart: Waiting for justice in Kenya’s Mt Elgon Region 
was launched. The Universal Periodic Review, September 2010 – September 2011also reported on the 
Human Rights Watch report and raised concerns about the TJRC. 
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reporting period, at least two legislators and one political activist who had earlier been 
arraigned in court on hate speech charges were found not guilty and acquitted.75 It is 
hoped the ruling will not hinder attempts to curb use of hate speech and divisive 
rhetoric by the political class. A Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
commissioner also appeared before the NCIC to defend himself against claims that he 
made incendiary comments in a press article alleging that a certain community should 
never lead Kenya again. 76 This was viewed as hate speech against the particular 
community. NCIC is yet to make a decision on the matter.77 
 
161. The NCIC trained over 200 teachers on how to use drama in the promotion of 
messages of peace. It has also taken the same teachers to Rwanda to have a firsthand 
experience of the genocide memorials so that they can return to share knowledge with 
their counterparts how to handle explosive situations in their specific areas. It has also 
partnered with the Kenya Institute of Education in formulating a school syllabus that 
covers peace and reconciliation. 
 
162. The NCIC, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and 
Constitutional Affairs, has embarked on developing a National Values policy to be a 
guideline on ethical issues. It also launched the National Cohesion and Integration 
Manual, to be used by different actors in the dissemination of cohesion and integration 
messages around the country.78 
 
163. The Commission predicts that Kenya’s next General Election in 2012 will be peaceful.79 
Religious leaders have also expressed concerns about the slow pace of healing and 
reconciliation in the country. They have asked the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities to push the political leaders to be proactive in the healing process before 
the next General Election.80 
 
164. It is notable that in the December survey, 62 percent of respondents said “just a little” 
reconciliation between communities had taken place since the post-election violence 
while another 8 percent said there was no reconciliation at all. This means that, even 
though there has been no violence, communities have not reconciled. 
 
                                                
75‘Machage’s hate speech to go to trial’ The Standard, 25 October 2011’, also ‘Suspects fight hate speech 
charges’ The Daily Nation, 18 November 2011 
76 Omar Hassan ‘What do Kibaki’s men know or what they are planning’, Sunday Nation, 27 November 2011 
77 ‘Activistreports Omar to Kibunja team over hate speech’ The Standard, 30 November 2011 
78 ‘NCIC launches Training Manual NCIC press release,  Daily Nation, 22 November2011, p.39  
79 ‘NCIC: 2012 General Election likely to be peaceful.’ The Standard 10 October 2011, p. 24   
80 Message of Religious Community in Kenya to the Panel of Eminent African PersonPersonalities led by Kofi 
Annan dated 19 October 2011 
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Figure 27: Thinking about healing and reconciliation among Kenyan communities after 
post-election violence, how much would you say communities have reconciled? (total) 
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have	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  (total)
 
 
165. A regional analysis shows that most people in the areas affected by violence in 2008 are 
of the view that there has not been sufficient reconciliation. However, 50 per cent of 
respondents in North Eastern said a lot of reconciliation had taken place:  
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Figure 28: Thinking about healing and reconciliation among Kenyan communities after the 
post-election violence, how much would you say communities have reconciled? (by region) 
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Conclusion 
 
166. The ICC process in Kenya has made progress bringing about accountability for 
the post election violence.However; there is no movement on holding the lower and 
middle level perpetrators of the violence accountable. Demand for domestic 
accountability for crimes has been reducing in terms of attention. This raises the need 
to increase public awareness, particularly because the government’s commitment to 
hold people accountable for PEV is an issue of concern.  
 
167. Failure to fight impunity, by establishing Complementarity mechanisms for domestic 
accountability for international crimes, and lack of trust in government programmes, 
suggests that the causes of the post election violence have not been addressed. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that a significant majority of Kenyans believe there 
will be no violence as result of the ICC investigation or during the next General 
Election.   
 
168. Internally displaced persons have continued to be a sore reminder of the post-election 
violence, yet their continued presence in a state of homelessness begs fundamental 
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questions about the reasons they are unable to go back to places from which they were 
displaced. The presence of IDPs is also a reminder that reconciliation is taking a while 
to firm up. A lot of efforts have been put into restoring peace and reconciliation in 
violence affected areas. However, it appears that such peace has not become deeply 
rooted as fear of reprisals and mistrust pervade the society. Ethnic divisions may be 
compounded by the outcome of the ICC, implementation of devolution and ahead of 
2012. Public vigilance is, therefore, important to ensure peaceful co-existence. 
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
169. Several conclusions have been drawn in the preceding sections. This section 
recapitulates some of the key issues for further discussion and/or intervention at 
different levels. To begin, the findings once again demonstrate that the cost of living is 
a major challenge facing the country today. This challenge affects everyone. The 
depreciation of the Kenya shilling in the last quarter of the 2011 was an additional 
burden on the economy.  An issue of concern, however, is that these challenges could 
compound and confound the growing problem of youth unemployment. This will 
complicate the context within which the next General Election will be contested and 
could even make the economy a major campaign issue. Such a shift would add value to 
the country’s politics because it would assist in making the competition an issue-based 
campaign. 
 
170. Notable also is the military action against Al Shabaab in Somalia, which adds a security 
dimension to these challenges. Close to 78 per cent of survey respondents approve of 
the government’s intervention in Somalia against the Al Shabaab. However, still not 
many think the country is headed in the right direction. Only 28 per cent of survey 
respondents think it is. As many as 69 per cent think the country is headed in the 
wrong direction. Also, as many as 80 per cent of respondents were not satisfied with 
the measures the government was taking to address economic problems. 
 
171. With regard to the implementation of the constitution, the development of Bills and the 
construction of a legislative framework is on track. However, there are delays in 
passing some of the requisite laws. These delays could result in the Parliament rushing 
to debate and pass Bills without public participation and scrutiny.  
 
172. An important finding is that the ongoing composition of new bodies is resulting in 
leaders deepening ‘horse-trading’ and patronage approaches in appointments to key 
positions. Although initial efforts at recruitment emphasised transparency and merit, 
there are new attempts to bring back old habits. Leaders are protecting and defending 
applicants from their home regions under the guise of merit. The result is absence of 
balance between merit and ethnic or even gender equity. Good candidates are missing 
out on account of thisif they do not have ethnic power brokers to present their case. 
Those appointed through horse-trading and patronage-based processes can easily be 
compromised in the future. This will reduce public confidence in these institutions. It is 
important therefore to adhere strictly to transparent, ethical and merit based 
appointment procedures reflecting article 10 and the spirit of Chapter 6 on leadership 
and integrity under the constitution. 
 
173. The devolved system of government is clearly under threat, going by developments 
around the Public Finance Management Bill. Delays in finalising some of the Bills on 
the devolved system of government could delay preparations for the transition to the 
dual system after the next General Election. This raises a need to yet again evolve 
dispute resolution mechanisms for the purpose of stepping in as soon as a problem 
arises between any of the agencies performing any role in developing laws or even 
implementing them. 
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174. The findings show continued support for the ICC intervention. There areconcerns, 
however, that action is yet to be taken on the middle and low level perpetrators of 
violence. As the next General Election approaches, the government may need to send a 
clear message that it is not business as usual for those who participated in the post-
election violence. Demonstrating that the government is watching these perpetrators is 
critical in stopping the mobilisation of youth for political violence. The signs of 
localised violence are slowly coming to the fore.  
 
175. Finally, it is important to underline that the Coalition government has not been very 
cohesive during much of its time. Although it has matured over time, it is important to 
establish a solid framework to resolve any disputes that may arise between now and the 
time of conducting the next general election. Internal divisions especially over power 
sharing could have negative consequences on the electoral process. Furthermore, if 
divisions deepen before the general election, ensuing institutional immobility will 
make it difficult for the government to operate as one. A framework to ensure 
coherence must be put in place – reactivating the Committee for the Management of 
Coalition Affairs is critical at this stage. 
 
